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DENVER LAW CENTER JOURNAL
ONE YEAR REVIEW OF TORTS
By WILLIAM H. ERICKSON*
and CHARLES F. BREGA**
The law of torts in Colorado did not suffer any radical change
in 1962. The decisions of the supreme court interpreting the tort law
of Colorado were largely confined to clarification of existing prin-
ciples. Established statutory construction, even though controverted
on constitutional theories, remained the same. In attempting to re-
view the decisions of the court, the authors will combine the tort
cases under the particular category of tort law involved. Only those
decisions will be the subject of comment which, in the authors'
opinion, distinguished, clarified, or otherwise modified the existing
law of torts in Colorado.
I. THE LAW OF NEGLIGENCE IN 1962
A. Physical Facts v. Sworn Testimony
The factual controversies in the tort cases before the court lead
to the reenunciation of the principle that sworn testimony cannot
dispute or set aside established physical facts. In Sevier v. Hendrix,'
the plaintiff, while driving south on an ice and snow covered Valley
Highway, lost control of his car in a skid and came to a complete
stop in the left hand lane of the southbound section of the highway.
Thereafter, he was passed by various cars going in the same direc-
tion, until the defendant, driving a truck, ran into him. The defend-
ant claimed that testimony as to the point of impact and as to the
acts of negligence complained of was contrary to the physical evi-
dence and should not be accepted as true, when disputed by mere
eye witness testimony. In refusing to accept the defendant's theory
and in affirming the judgment in favor of the plaintiff, the court
found that there was not present that requisite state of physical
facts which would clearly indicate an absence of negligence on the
part of the defendant and said:
In the instant case there is not present the requisite
"admitted physical facts" which "clearly" indicate an ab-
sence of negligence on the part of the defendant, and the
rule contended for is not applicable. As stated in Swanson
v. Martin, 120 Colo. 361, 209 P.2d 917, 919: ". . . . it is only in
the clearest of cases, when the facts are undisputed and it
is plain that all intelligent men can draw but one inference
from them, that the question is ever one of law for the
court." (Emphasis supplied.) 2
A reverse twist came about when the plaintiff sought to look
to the physical facts to set aside an adverse jury determination in
a controversy involving an intersection collision. In Anderson v.
Lett,3 the plaintiff sought to show that the uncontrovertible phy-
* Partner, Hindry, Erickson & Meyer, Denver.
* Associate, Hindry, Erickson & Meyer, Denver.
1 367 P.2d 750 (Colo. 1962).
2 Id. at 751. See also Elliott v. Hill, 366 P.2d 663 (Colo. 1961).
3 374 P.2d 355 (Colo. 1962).
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sical facts established by the evidence forced the conclusion that the
defendant was negligent as a matter of law and that the plaintiff
was not contributorily negligent. The facts, however, were not of
the quality, in the court's opinion, that would justify the plaintiff's
position and caused the court to say:
In the instant case both parties have attempted to use
mathematical formulae to demonstrate the correctness of
their positions. They have applied these formulae to evi-
dence of speed and distance given by the parties which
were but approximations. The application of such formulae
to these approximations demonstrates that but very small
deviations in the estimate of speed or distance factors
would necessarily affect the conclusions to be reached as to
which of these parties entered the intersection against the
red light. Under such circumstances, the question of wheth-
er the evidence given by one party or the other conflicted
with scientific principles becomes one for the jury and not
for the court. Conner v. Jones, 115 Ind. App. 660, 59 N.E.
2d 577.
Courts cannot indulge in arbitrary deductions from
scientific laws as applied to evidence except where the
conclusions reached are so irrefutable that no room is left
for the entertainment by reasonable minds of any other
conclusion. Garrison v. Ryno, (Mo.) 328 S.W. 2d 557. Here
it cannot be said that mathematical calculations demons-
trate beyond controversy that Lett was negligent and Linda
was not.
4
B. Res Ipsa Loquitur
A verdict for the plaintiff against alleged joint tort-feasors was
reversed and remanded with directions for a new trial in Chapman
v. Redwine. 5 The majority found that the plaintiff, who was cut by
a pop bottle in a supermarket, had no claim against the bottling
company because the physical facts were contrary to the sworn
testimony. The plaintiff testified that she heard an explosion and
then realized her leg was cut above the ankle and saw glass and
liquid on the floor. Admittedly, the plaintiff did not see any bottle
explode and did not observe any glass or liquid on the display rack
or in any place other than on the floor, and none of the cola was on
her dress. In analyzing the evidence relating to the bottling com-
pany, the court said:
It is common knowledge and within the very nature of
things that when and if a bottle filled with liquid resting
on a shelf explodes, glass fragments, liquid, other bottles,
broken or knocked over, remain on the shelf. On the hap-
pening of such an event one does not find all of the glass
fragments and liquid in an area about three feet in dia-
meter on a concrete floor some feet away from the shelf
where the bottle was resting and where the explosion is
alleged to have occurred.
The location of the glass and liquid tells the true story
4 Id. at 357.
i 370 P.2d 147 (Colo. 1962).
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much more convincingly than the cry of "explosion" on
which plaintiff predicates her whole case.
To accept plaintiff's story that a bottle exploded on the
shelf, one would have to ignore simple facts of life, shut
one's eyes to reality, substitute fiction and fantasy for fact,
do a complete overhaul job on the law of gravity, and live
in a land of make believe.
Not all noises are explosions. A filled bottle explodes
when the inside pressure is so great as to exceed the con-
taining strength of the bottle ....
Evidence offered by plaintiff to prove that a bottle ex-
ploded on a shelf of the display rack was insufficient to
warrant the trial court in submitting the matter to the jury
on the theory of an exploding bottle and it was error to
instruct the jury on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur as
applied to exploding bottles.6
However, as to the defendant supermarket, the court found that the
plaintiff was entitled to rely on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur,
since she was a business invitee and the evidence disclosed that the
defendant supermarket was in the exclusive possession of the build-
ing and its contents, which included the bottle which fell or was
knocked from a shelf and broke, causing the injuries in question.
The opinion brought a fiery dissent from Justice Sutton, who
viewed the facts differently than did the majority when they found
that there was no evidence of a sticky substance on the shelf that
held the bottle. Justice Sutton contended that the majority was
invading the province of the jury and acting as the ultimate trier
of the fact and said that the facts called for the application of the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur as to both defendants. The reasoning
which provides the basis for his dissent was that:
1. The plaintiff was in no position to establish the
cause of the explosion or fall of the bottle which resulted
in her injury.
2. The bottler could show that the bottle did not ex-
plode, if such were the case, and, the store owner could
show, if such were the case, that the bottle did not fall from
the shelf because of safe construction, ample aisle width
and so forth.
3. A suit against joint tort-feasors under the doctrine
even though finally only one was held liable, has been up-
held by our court. Beadles v. Metayka, 135 Colo. 366, 311
P.2d 711 (1957), (doctor held liable when he, hospital and
anesthetist were joined as defendants when a patient fell
from an operating table). Compare Ybarra v. Spangard, 25
Cal.2d 486, 154 P.2d 687, 162 A.L.R. 1258 (a doctor, nurse,
hospital, patient case).
My position is that under the facts and pleadings of
this case the jury was entitled to find that the bottle ex-
ploded and, in the absence of satisfactory proof exonerating
them of negligence, could find both defendants liable.7
6 Id. at 149.
7 Id. at 153. See also Pound, The Problem of the Exploding Bottle, 40 B.UL. Rev. 167 (1960).
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C. Expert Witnesses
In a far reaching decision, McNelley v. Smith,s the court went
a long way toward restricting the place of the accidentologist in a
controverted automobile collision. The facts in the McNelley case
were disputed, with the principal question being whether McNelley,
while waiting to make a left turn, was struck from behind and
knocked into the path of an oncoming truck, or whether McNelley
pulled into the path of the oncoming truck and was struck and
knocked into the front end of the truck which was following him
on the highway. The highway patrolman played a significant role
in the trial court in resolving the factual dispute by giving his
opinion as to the manner in which the accident occurred. He said
that his opinion was founded in part on the physical facts which
he observed at the scene of the accident and in part on the state-
ment of one of the parties which was taken at the scene of the acci-
dent. He had not taken statements from either of the two other
parties involved, because one was dead and the other was uncon-
scious. The officer's testimony related not only to physical facts
which he determined when he investigated the collision, but also
included his opinion regarding the speed of the vehicles involved,
the point of impact, the angle of impact, which he based on the
damage done to each vehicle, and the physical facts at the scene.
In reversing and remanding for a new trial, the court said:
While it is no longer a valid objection in Colorado that
the opinion of an expert witness resolves the ultimate con-
clusion which the jury is to determine, Bridges v. Lintz,
140 Colo. 582, 346 P.2d 571, evidence of this nature is ad-
missible only when the subject matter is such that a jury
cannot be expected to draw correct inferences from the
facts. There is no need for expert opinion with reference
to facts involving commonplace occurrences. Blackburn v.
Tombling, 148 Colo. -, 365 P.2d 243. Expert testimony is
not admissible solely because the witness has some skill in
a particular field, but it is admissible, if at all, only because
the witness can offer assistance on a matter not within the
knowledge or common experience of people of ordinary
intelligence.
It was competent in this case for the officer to testify
as to the point of impact and the angle of collision, matters
which he determined solely from the physical facts existing
at the scene of the accident. It was not competent for him
to give his opinion as to how the McNelley car got into the
southbound lane of traffic and into the path of the tractor
trailer. From the physical facts testified to by the witnesses,
including the patrolman, it was well within the competency
of the jury to determine the ultimate issue in the case, that
is, by whose negligence the McNelley car was placed in the
path of the oncoming trailer tractorY
After condemning the opinion given by the highway patrolman, the
court went on to place further restrictions on the accidentologist
with the following statement:
S 368 P.2d 555 (Colo. 1962).
9 Id. at 557.
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During presentation of the defense, McNelley too pre-
sented an expert who attempted to testify as to the cause
of the accident. This expert's opinion was to be based solely
on photographs of the vehicles taken at the scene of the
accident. Under the circumstances presented here, the trial
court correctly refused to permit this evidence. It is inter-
esting to note that in the cases cited by counsel in defense
of this exclusion the courts have held that jurors of ordi-
nary intelligence are just as capable of reasoning backward
from the evidence in automobile accidents, such as the one
under consideration here, and making a correct analysis as
to what has happened as is the expert.1 0
The ratio decidendi of the decision in McNelley is that an acci-
dentologist may not give his opinion as to the cause of a collision
when the jury is capable of drawing correct inferences from the
facts. The decision properly limits the use of hearsay, but limits and
restricts a long line of cases, commencing with Ison v. Stewart1
and will undoubtedly handicap both the plaintiff and defendant in
establishing causation with the testimony of an accident expert.
12
D. The Whiplash - Rear End Collision
Two cases highlighted the oft-complained of whiplash injury:
Moseley v. Lamirato13 and Sullivan v. Laman.
14
Moseley v. Lamirato was a typical rear end collision that was
followed by the plaintiff's recognition of the customary whiplash,
or more correctly speaking, cervical sprain complaints. At the con-
clusion of the defense case, the trial court directed a verdict on the
issue of liability in favor of the plaintiff. The Lamirato car was
admittedly stopped for traffic, and Moseley said that he failed to
see that traffic was stopped until it was too late to avoid the colli-
sion. With the acts of the parties as well defined as they were in the
instant case, the court held that the question of negligence and con-
tributory negligence was one for resolution by the court.15 However,
the court's duty did not end with the determination of liability, and
the medical testimony relating to the permanency of Lamirato's
injury had to be reviewed. The defendant claimed that the injuries
to the plaintiff's cervical spine were not of a permanent nature and
questioned the right of the treating osteopathic physician to testify
as to the permanency of the injury. The court, however, resolved
the right of the osteopathic fraternity to testify and said that the
issue of permanency and the weight to be given the osteopath's
testimony was a matter for the jury's determination. Also before
the court was the plaintiff's second claim for relief which was di-
rected against a claim service that had allegedly agreed to repair
the Lamirato car and then when the car was to be released had
conditioned payment upon the signing of a general release. The de-
fendant made a belated motion for a separate trial as to the second
claim for relief, and, even though the insurance aspect of the case
10 Id. at 558.
11 105 Colo. 55, 94 P.2d 701 (1939).
12 See Ferguson v. Hurford, 132 Colo. 507, 290 P.2d 229 (1955); cf. Annot., 66 A L.R.2d 1043 (1957).
13 370 P.2d 450 (Colo 1962).
14 375 P.2d 92 (Colo. 1962).
15 See also Ridenour v. Diffee, 133 Colo. 467, 297 P.2d 280 (1956); Clark v. Joslin Dry Goods Co.,
128 Colo. 317, 262 P.2d 546 (1953); Grand Junction v. Lashmett, 126 Colo. 256, 247 P.2d 909 (1952).
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became clear to the jury by reason of the second claim for relief,
the court held that the defendant had slept on his rights by not
moving for a separate trial at an earlier time. 6
Sullivan v. Laman17 also involved a rear end collision with the
anomaly of a defense verdict. Again, heavy traffic precipitated the
collision, which formulated the defendant's basis for obtaining an
instruction on unavoidable accident in the trial court. In reversing
and remanding the case for a new trial, because of the trial court's
instruction on unavoidable accident, the court said:
In Carr v. Boyd, 123 Colo. 350, 229 P. (2d) 659 and
Herdt v. Darbin, 126 Colo. 355, 249 P. (2d) 822 we clearly
indicated that the giving of an instruction on 'unavoidable
accident' in a case in which there was no evidence upon
which a finding of such an accident could properly be
based, is reversible error.
Careful examination of the record convinces us that
there is no competent evidence upon which the jury could
reasonably find that the accident was unavoidable and that
the giving of such an instruction constituted reversible
error.
In Jacobsen v. McGinness, 135 Colo. 357, 311 P. (2d) 696
it was said that 'the instruction on unavoidable accident
given by the trial court was erroneous, it tended not only to
divert the minds of the jurors from the decisive issues of
negligence and contributory negligence, but suggested that
under the evidence the parties might be held blameless for
reasons other than their freedom from negligence or con-
tributory negligence.' (Emphasis supplied.)
See also Piper v. Mayer, 145 Colo. 391, 360 P. (2d) 433,
which is a definitive review and analysis of the many re-
cent decisions of this court concerning the propriety of an
instruction on unavoidable accident. In that case we con-
cluded that an instruction on unavoidable accident pos-
sesses only 'limited usefulness' and has 'been restricted in
its application to a particular type of case.' Illustrative of
'particular type' of case in which an instruction on unavoid-
able accident has been held proper, are Ridley v. Young,
127 Colo. 46, 253 P. (2d) 433, (evidence of a locked front
16 Colo. R. Civ. P, 42(b). Cf. Greenspoon v. Parke-Davis, 8 F.R.D. 485 (1948); Young v. Colorado
Nat'l Bank, 365 P.2d 701 (Colo. 1961).
17 375 P.2d 92 (Colo. 1962).
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wheel); Parker v. Couch, 145 Colo. 209, 358 P. (2d) 609 (evi-
dence of a severe dust storm); and Iacino v. Brown, 121
Colo. 450, 217 P. (2d 266 (evidence of mechanical defect in
steering wheel)."'
E. Unavoidable Accident
In Dugan v. Kuner-Empson Co.,19 the plaintiff brought suit for
injuries which he sustained while assisting the defendant's foreman
in loading a barrel of pickles at the defendant's plant. The injury
occurred while the plaintiff was endeavoring to help push the bar-
rel onto his own truck. While the barrel was at an angle, someone
said, "I've got it," and the defendant's foreman released the barrel,
crushing the plaintiff's fingers against the side of his own truck.
The supreme court upheld the defense verdict and the giving of the
following unavoidable accident instruction:
The jury is instructed that if you find from the evi-
dence that the accident was unavoidable,, then none of the
parties is entitled to damages.
An unavoidable accident is one happening suddenly
and unexpectedly and without negligence on the part of
anyone.
In the event that you find that the accident was un-
avoidable, then you are instructed to bring in a verdict in
favor of the defendant.
2
The court concluded that the giving of the instruction was necessary
to a proper presentation of the defendant's theory of the case and
said, after considering the record: "The jury could easily have con-
cluded from the evidence in this case that neither party was at fault




In Myers v. Myers,2 2 a husband and wife imbibed freely of the
cup before the husband entered into the serious task of driving.
When a collision occurred, with the husband driving while intoxi-
cated, the wife sued alleging willful and wanton conduct to avoid
the guest statute. Instructions were given on contributory negli-
gence and assumption of risk over the defendant wife's objection,
and a defense verdict was returned. In upholding the giving of the
instructions, the court said:
This court has on many occasions since 1936 clearly and
concisely held that where a claim is made by a passenger
of an automobile for injuries as a result of the intoxication
or wilfulness and wantonness of the driver, instructions to
the jury on contributory negligence and assumption of risk
are proper if there is evidence justifying their submission.
[Citations omitted.] The instructions given in the instant
case on these issues were complete and proper under the
evidence.
23
18 Id. at 93.
19 369 P.2d 82 (Colo. 1962).
20 Id. at 84.
21 Ibid.
22 375 P.2d 525 (Colo. 1962).




Two cases found their way to the supreme court which in-
volved alleged malpractice by those engaged in the healing arts.
Chiropractic practices gave rise to the first controversy. In Klim-
kiewicz v. Karnick,'2 4 the court set aside a substantial jury verdict
for the plaintiff which had been based on a chiropractor's negli-
gence. The plaintiff, a school teacher, engaged the defendant chiro-
practor to give her heat treatments and to adjust and manipulate
her arm and shoulder. During the course of the treatment, accord-
ing to the plaintiff, the defendant suddenly and with tremendous
force yanked her right arm, thereby causing permanent damage to
its muscles and nerves. It was stipulated that the defendant's tech-
niques were part of proper chiropractic treatment. The defendant's
chiropractic experts testified that the injuries complained of could
not have occurred from the treatment which was rendered. Ortho-
pedic experts, however, in answer to hypothetical questions which
included disputed facts, gave testimony which tied the chiropractic
treatment to the injury. The supreme court condemned as present-
ing an improper measure of the chiropractor's duties instructions
defining ordinary care as that exercised by a person of ordinary
intelligence and prudence under similar circumstances. They held
that the proper test was whether or not the defendant chiropractor
had treated the plaintiff in accordance with the principles and
standards of his school of medicine as measured by the ordinary
skill and care afforded by other members of his profession in the
same community who were engaged in the same line of practice.
They also found instructions given on life expectancy improper,
because no evidence was contained in the record to establish the
plaintiff's age.
In McCarty v. Goldstein 2 5 the supreme court upheld a sum-
mary judgment2" which was entered in favor of a dentist in a mal-
practice action on the basis of the two-year statute of limitations.2 7
Prior to the entry of the summary judgment, the plaintiff had
moved to strike the affirmative plea of the two-year statute of
limitations, alleging that the limitative statute was violative of the
fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution and article
V, section 25, of the Colorado Constitution. The plaintiff's theory
for striking the allegation, when summarized, was that Colo. Rev.
Stat. § 87-1-6 (1953) (the two-year statute of limitations), consti-
tuted special legislation. The supreme court, however, found that
the classification set forth in the statute was reasonable and had a
reasonable relationship to the persons dealt with and to the public
purposes sought to be achieved by the legislation and, therefore,
was constitutional.
H. Last Clear Chance
In Sedlmayr v. Lung,2 the plaintiff's husband was killed when
he was struck by the defendant's car while he was riding a horse.
The pleadings raised issues of the defendant's negligence, contribu-
24 372 P.2d 736 (Colo. 1962).
25 376 P.2d 691 (Colo. 1962).
26 Colo. R. Civ. P. 56.
27 Colo. Rev. Stat.§ 87-1-6 (1953).
28 372 P.2d 949 (Colo. 1962).
1963
DENVER LAW CENTER JOURNAL
tory negligence of the deceased, unavoidable accident, and last clear
chance. A defense verdict was rendered and error was predicated
upon the failure of the trial court to grant a proper instruction on
last clear chance. The defendant, in turn, alleged cross-error, be-
cause a verdict had not been directed in his favor. In examining the
record, the court found that there was no evidence that the defend-
ant had an opportunity to avoid the accident or knew or should
have known of the presence of the deceased until the horse carry-
ing the deceased plunged into the right side of his car. In holding
that the trial court erred in refusing to grant the defense motion
for a directed verdict and in giving an instruction on last clear
chance, the court again set forth the measure for giving an instruc-
tion on last clear chance and said:
To make the last clear chance doctrine applicable, it
must be established, independent of the doctrine itself, that
the defendant after the peril of the injured party arose, was
chargeable with negligence constituting a proximate cause
of the injury. In the instant case there was no evidence to
show a failure on the part of defendant to exercise ordinary
care, either before, or at the time of, the accident.
The doctrine of last clear chance pre-supposes a peril-
ous situation created or existing through the negligence of
both plaintiff and defendant, but it is assumed that there
was a time after such negligence had occurred when the de-
fendant could, and the plaintiff could not, by the use of
means available, avert the accident ....
Before a case may be submitted to a jury with an in-
struction on last clear chance, there must be evidence in
the record that defendant had a clear chance to avoid the
collision. "9
I. Liability of a Landowner
Elsworth v. Colorado Beverage Co. " was a slip and fall case in
which a landowner obtained a summary judgment that the supreme
court sustained. The defendant landowner operated a beverage com-
pany which abutted a publicly owned street which was sometimes
used for parking. The plaintiff fell on ice that appeared on the
street abutting the defendant's property. The court held that even
though the defendant's customers did park on the public street ad-
joining the defendant's building, the defendant did not have a duty
to keep the public street free from ice, when the ice and snow com-
plained of did not result from the affirmative acts of the defendant.
J. Intervening Cause
In Jensen v. South Adams County Water Dist.,"' a fourteen
year old girl sued the defendant water company for injuries which
she suffered when her foot slipped into the defendant's water meter
box which had the cover plate removed. The meter box in question
was covered with a cast iron plate that was held in place by a many-
sided nut. Below the cover plate was a frost plate which was not
29 Id. at 950.
30 370 P.2d 159 (Colo. 1962).
31 368 P.2d 209 (Colo. 1962).
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secured by any device. The plaintiff was injured when she stepped
on the frost plate which tilted and caused her to fall and sustain
her injuries. She charged that the defendant water company was
not only negligent in failing to provide a proper securing device to
keep the cover plate in position, but also was negligent in failing
to properly secure the cover plate on the meter. Testimony was
offered by the defendant to establish that the meter had been read
and the cover plate secured three weeks before the tragedy, and
that boys had been seen removing the cover plate prior to the time
that the injury occurred. A defense verdict was obtained but was
set aside by the supreme court; a new trial was ordered because
of the instructions given to the jury. It was the defendant's con-
tention that the acts of third parties without knowledge or fault
on the defendant's part created an efficient intervening cause, and
instructions were given which would exonerate the defendant from
liability if the cover plate was removed by third parties.
The defendant also obtained an instruction relating to the nec-
essity of notice of a dangerous condition before it became the defend-
ant's duty to remedy the same. In reversing the trial court, the su-
preme court held that notice to the defendant of a dangerous or
defective condition is a non-essential element to recovery when the
defective or dangerous condition was created as a result of the de-
fendant's negligence. The court found that the question of the pro-
priety of using a fastener of the type used by the defendant to keep
the cover plate in a safe position was an issue for the jury to deter-
mine. The court also found that the instruction which freed the
defendant from fault if the cover was removed by a third person
was error, because in Colorado it was a jury question as to whether
the proximate cause of the injury was a result of the combined neg-
ligence of the defendant and the negligence or wrongful act of a
third person. An injury, said the court, which is the result of the
combined negligence of the defendant and the negligence or wrong-
ful act of a third person, for whose act neither the plaintiff nor the
defendant is responsible, creates liability on behalf of the defendant,
when the injury would not have happened except for the defend-
ant's negligence.
II. WILD ANIMALS
A coyote was declared to be a wild animal which would cause
its owner to suffer absolute liability for injuries inflicted by the
coyote in Collins v. Otto.32 Mr. Justice Day, speaking for the su-
preme court, ruled that a coyote was a wild animal with vicious
propensities which placed its owner in the position that he kept the
animal at his peril. In the trial court, a defense verdict was ren-
dered after instructions were given that included contributory neg-
ligence of the four year old child who was the subject of the
coyote's attack. In reversing, the supreme court remanded the case
for retrial on the issue of damages alone.
III. WRONGFUL DEATH
The supreme court found the much controverted "net pecuniary
loss rule" to be the subject of constitutional attack in two cases-
:2 369 P.2d 564 (Colo. 1962).
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Herbertson v. RussellV and Kogul v. Sonheim.3 4 In the Herbertson
case, the six year old daughter of the plaintiffs was crushed under
the rear wheels of a gravel truck. In the trial court, damages were
awarded in the sum of $25,000.00. In reversing the case, with direc-
tions for a new trial on the issue of damages alone, the supreme
court found that even though damages for a wrongful death need
not and cannot generally be proven with mathematical certainty,
there still exists the requirement that damages be shown to have
occurred at least with a reasonable degree of certainty from the
wrongful death. The court found that the evidence was legally
insufficient to support the award of $25,000.00. In remanding the
case, the court recognized that loss of the right to a child's earnings
during her minority were properly the subject of compensation, as
was the right of the parents to assistance from their daughter dur-
ing their declining years. However, the court reiterated the oft-
repeated rule that damages in a wrongful death case are compen-
satory only, and may not be exemplary in the sense that they are
imposed as a penalty against the wrongdoer or a solatium for the
grief of the death of their minor child. No evidence was found by
the court which would justify the $25,000.00 award which was made
by the court. In giving new life to Pierce v. Connor,'", the court
emphasized the fact that the legislature had reenacted a statute
which had received a settled judicial construction and had amended
only the limitation on the amount of recovery and by reenactment
had established that the legislative intent was that the judiciary
should adhere to its former constructions of the statute.
Justice Frantz, supported by Justice Moore and Justice Pringle
who dissented, concurred in supporting the reversal, but refused to
accept the reasoning of the majority opinion. Justice Frantz ques-
tioned the constitutionality of the statute as being violative of the
inalienable rights, :6 equality of justice.37 and due process 3 provi-
sions of the state constitution.
Justice Frantz analyzed the damages to a parent in the follow-
ing language:
When these relationships [parent and child] are dis-
rupted, either by injury or death, what damages should be
visited upon the wrong-doer? The damages should be the
natural product of the act. These damages involve mental
anguish, loss of love and affection, the society and com-
panionship, the loss of protection and comfort, and the loss
of the decedent's earnings, if any, resulting from the injury
or death. [Citations omitted.]
Because of what has been said in this opinion, I would
say that two natural rights are violated, the right of the
individual in that her life has been taken, and the rights of
her family and the members thereof, and that damages
should be allowed in both these respects.
3 9
In Kogul v. Sonheim,40 which could easily be said to be the
"3 371 P.2d 422 (Colo. 1962).
34 372 P.2d 731 (Colo. 1962).
35 20 Colo. 178, 37 Pac. 721 (1894).
36 Colo. Const. art. II, § 3.
37 Colo. Const. art. II, § 6.
38 Colo. Const. art. II, § 25.
39 Note 33 supra at 430.
40 Note 34 supra.
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most talked about decision of the year, the court, construing Colo.
Rev. Stat. § 41-1-1 (1953) in the strictest terms, held that an award
of $700.00 for the wrongful death of a three-year-old child was not
grossly inadequate when measured by the net pecuniary loss. In
the Kogul case, a child was killed when the defendant's spot wel-
der, which was stored near the plaintiff's property, in an elevated
and unstable place, fell on top of him. The theory of the plaintiff's
case was that the defendant had created an attractive nuisance and
that the damages for wrongful death must necessarily include the
reasonable replacement value of the child including the cost of
infantile hospitalization, care, clothing, support and education up
to the time of the child's death and such other expenses as would
be necessarily incurred in the raising of the child. The bereaved
parents found that in Colorado the following instruction has the
approval of the supreme court:
The net pecuniary or monetary loss, if any, which the
plaintiffs might reasonably have expected to receive from
the continuation of his life less the cost of properly and
suitably maintaining and educating him.
4'
After the giving of such an instruction, the jury returned a
verdict in favor of the parents against the owner of the spot welder
for $700.00. In upholding the verdict, the court refused to accept
the liberal interpretation given to similar statutes in other states
and said that any change in our law must come from the legisla-
ture.42 The court's decision found Justice Moore concurring spe-
cially and questioning the constitutional arguments which were
voiced by Justice Frantz and Justice Hall in their dissent. Justice
Frantz, dissenting again looked to the constitution for support of
his argument and said:
For us to sanction a judgment in this amount on the
theory that only net pecuniary loss represents the measure
of damages where the boy's death resulted from fault is to
defer to an essentially materialistic tenet discordant with
the word and spirit of the Constitution of this state. Mate-
rialism and our Bill of Rights are intrinsically antagonistic.
I cannot believe that the "natural, essential and inalien-
able" right to enjoy life, given measured recognition in the
Bill of Rights (Art. II, Sec. 3, Const. Colo.) is, in this case,
41 Ibid.
42 Cf. Wyco v. Gnodtke, 361 Mich. 331, 105 N.W.2d 118 (1960); Fussner v. Andert, 261 Minn. 347,
113 N.W.2d 355 (1961).
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just a beautiful aspiration and nothing more. Yet that is
the effect of the majority opinion. For all that remains, at
most, is the moral right to enjoy life; the right recognized
by law-indeed, guaranteed by the Constitution-is little
more than nothing in a juridical sense.
I would have this constitutional provision be more than
"sonority without content," more than "sounding brass,"
more than the subject of patriotic orations. It is our solemn
duty to give these words of the Bill of Rights their manda-
tory meaning and not reduce them to a hortatory signifi-
cance.
The "right" to enjoy life envisages "duty" as its corre-
lative. A right without a corresponding duty is semantic
emasculation. A legal right with only a corresponding moral
duty is jurisprudentially a solecism. A right in law loses its
true traditional dimension when not complemented by a
duty in law. Neither can stand alone and free of the other
without rendering both meaningless.
Other courts in recent times have been vexed with the
same problem. Some have refused to kowtow to stare decisis
on less tenable grounds than I propose. Indeed, these courts
have re-interpreted their wrongful death statutes, and in so
doing have expanded the measure of damages beyond net
pecuniary loss, to permit recovery for loss of the comfort,




In Spaur v. City of Greeley4 4 the court ruled that an aircraft
owner who uses a municipal airport stands in the position of a
bailee for hire and may look to the municipality for damages which
were occasioned as a result of the bailment. The plaintiff's aircraft
suffered damage as a result of being negligently tied down at the
Greeley Municipal Airport. When suit was brought in the county
court, a motion to dismiss was made and honored on the theory of
sovereign immunity and for failure to state a claim upon which
relief could be granted. Thereafter, the matter was appealed to the
district court and again dismissed on the theory of sovereign im-
munity. The supreme court, in following its earlier pronouncement
in Ace Flying Service, Inc. v. Colorado Dep't of Agriculture , 4 held
that sovereign immunity does not exist when contracts of a local
governmental unit are involved.
V. CLAIMS MADE UNDER THE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT
The supreme court held that a claimant must show that an
accident or overexertion proximately caused the fatal heart attack
for which death benefits are being sought in Industrial Comm'n of
Colo. v. Hesler.46 In the Hesler case, a widow filed for death bene-
fits for her husband, who was a road grade operator. Admitted-
ly, the deceased was operating the road grader at the time of his
death and within the scope of his employment, but under the
43 Note 34 supro at 735.
44 372 P.2d 730 (Colo. 1962).
45 136 Colo. 19, 314 P.2d 278 (1957).
46 370 P.2d 428 (Colo. 1962).
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statute,47 the court ruled that the death must be as a result of an
accident which was not the cause of the injury in the instant case.
In handing down the Hesler decision, the court said that the denial
of benefits was proper, because the evidence created only an in-
ference that the death occurred from overexertion while the de-
ceased was employed, and that the weight to be afforded this evi-
dence rested within the discretion of the Commission. See also
Watson v. Merritt,4M where a widow was refused death benefits for
the death of her husband, who had a coronary occlusion while
lifting a woman because there was no showing that he died per-
forming a duty normally performed by him while rendering aid
to a patient.
In Industrial Comm'n of Colo. v. Standard Ins. Co.,' the court
declared that an employer is liable for the ultimate permanent disa-
bility suffered by an employee under the Workmen's Compensation
Act, even though such disability may have been partially or wholly
the result of unsuccessful or negligent treatment by a physician
furnished by the employer. However, the doctor is a third person
under the Act, and, where the employee settled the malpractice
suit against the doctor, the employer was entitled to a right of
subrogation against the employee for that amount of money.
The supreme court was faced with the question of determining
when this state has jurisdiction over a compensation claim in R.C.S.
Lumber Co. v. Worthy."' Here, the claimant was killed in New
Mexico, but had been in Colorado performing work for his em-
ployer. The claimant filed under Colorado compensation law, and
the court said that any two of the following three requirements
will give this state jurisdiction:
1. A contract of employment created in Colorado.
2. Employment in Colorado under a contract created out-
side of the state.
3. Substantial employment in Colorado.
After setting forth the requirements, the court did not find
that two of the three requirements were present and, therefore,
denied the claim. Industrial Comm'n of Colo. v. Navajo Freight
Lines, Inc.,"1 stands as authority for the proposition that the Com-
mission must go by the medical reports and testimony given at
the hearing. In the principal case, the district court reversed the
referee who gave a 5% disability from an injury when the testi-
mony of both doctors at the hearing was that only 21/2 % of the
claimant's disability could be allocated to this injury, and the ruling
of the district court was sustained by the supreme court.
In Watson v. Merritt,"*-' the supreme court reiterated the rule
that in workmen's compensation cases the rules of evidence are
generally the same as they are in civil suits, and that where an em-
ployer who was also an examining physician made admissions and
declarations against the interest of his defense, the admissions con-
stituted prima facie evidence against him. Moreover, the admissions,
47 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 81-12-2(3) (1953).
48 369 P.2d 989 (Colo. 1962).
41) 370 P.2d 156 (Colo, 1962).
50 369 P.2d 985 (Colo. 1962).
51 367 P.2d 894 (Colo. 1962).
52 Note 48 supro.
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in the opinion of the court, could be treated by the trier of facts as
proof of the facts to which they related.
Where the employee's employer is doing a job with another
employer as a joint venture, the employees may be entitled to the
workmen's compensation coverage from either of the two em-
ployers.53 In this case the claimant was injured while working for
Snyder, who came within the Workmen's Compensation Act, but
had not taken out insurance. Snyder had agreed, however, with
Dillie that they would by joint venture do the particular job in
question. Dillie voluntarily elected to go under the Act. On the
job it appears that there were less than four men and that Snyder,
who was the employer who hired the claimant, was not covered
by insurance. The court held that the joint venturers could not
limit their workmen's compensation coverage by a private agree-
ment and that under their joint venture agreement they were each
liable as though each had done the hiring and the claimant was
entitled to make a claim against both Snyder and Dillie for com-
pensation benefits.
The court interpreted the following portion of Colo. Rev. Star.
§ 81-13-5 (1953) in Industrial Comm'n of Colo. v. Pearcy:
54
The right to compensation and benefits, as provided by
this chapter, shall be barred unless within six months after
the injury . . . a notice claiming compensation shall be
filed with the commission. This limitation shall not apply
to any claimant to whom compensation has been paid ....
(Emphasis supplied.) 71
By virtue of Pearcy, it is now clear that the legislature must
have meant compensation paid under Colorado law only and not
compensation within a period of six months which might have
been paid in any other state.
In Gugas v. Industrial Comm'n,5 6 the claimant requested com-
pensation for an injury which occurred in February of 1960, but
relied on an accident which occurred at an earlier time under
different circumstances. At the hearing, evidence and medical re-
ports were tendered describing an accident which the claimant
experienced in March of 1958 and which allegedly was the "acci-
dent" upon which the claimant relied. In denying recovery, the
supreme court said:
We know of no authority holding that a claimant may
assert a claim for workmen's compensation based exclu-
sively on an event allegedly occurring at a particular time
and place, and, upon failure to prove a compensable injury,
to be awarded compensation for an accident which occurred
two years prior to the event on which the claim is based,
and which occurred at a different place and under wholly
different circumstances.
5 7
Justice Sutton dissented in the Gugas case on the theory that
the two accidents were directly connected.
,3 Industrial Comm'n v. Lopez, 371 P.2d 269 (Colo. 1962).
54 369 P.2d 560 (Colo. 1962).
55 Id. at 562.
56 374 P.2d 702 (Colo. 1962).
57 Id. at 703.
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VI. MISCELLANEOUS TORT CASES OF INTEREST
A. Libel
The technical niceties and distinctions between libel per se and
libel per quod were the subject of analysis and definition in Bern-
stein v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc.5s The defendant credit agency had
published a report relating to the financial condition of a corpora-
tion. The report set forth that the financial information was taken
"from an unaudited interim financial statement submitted directly
by Harry Bernstein, CPA," and that Bernstein had failed to respond
to a request for an interview. The plaintiff's contention was that
the report contained information and statements that were libelous
per se. The defendant filed both a motion to dismiss and a motion
for bill of particulars; the motion for bill of particulars was granted.
The plaintiff refused to provide a bill of particulars as to the special
damages claimed and elected to stand on his complaint, rather than
to amend to meet the trial court's requirements. The trial court dis-
missed the case, and the supreme court affirmed and provided the
following analysis of the law of libel in Colorado:
This brings us to the crucial issue of whether the state-
ments in question constituted libel per se or libel per quod.
At the early common law all libel, of whatever kind,
was actionable without the pleading or proof of special
damages. Gradually, however, there developed in American
jurisprudence a distinction between libel per se and libel
per quod to the effect that any libel which carried its de-
famatory imputation on its face was actionable wi'hout an
allegation or proof of damages. See for example McKenzie
v. Denver Times, 3 Colo. App. 554, 34 P. 577 (1893). But any
libel which did not carry such imputation on its face was
held to be actionable only where special damages were
pleaded and proved .... Later, further gloss was added to
this area of the law, and today the rule accepted by the
majority of courts may be stated as follows:
"Any libel which carriefs] its defamatory imputation
upon its face fis] still held to be actionable without proof
of damages. But any libel which [does] not [is] held to be
actionable only where slander would be actionable-which
is to say, when special damage was pleaded and proved, or
the case fell into one of the four exceptional slander cate-
gories, of the imputation of crime, loathsome disease, de-
famation affecting business, or unchastity on the part of a
woman." Prosser, "Libel Per Quod", 46 Va.L.Rev. 838, 844
(1960).
We point out here that Dean Prosser in the article
above cited states that all of this rule is applicable in Colo-
rado on the basis of Knapp supra. A careful reading of the
Knapp case indicates that not all of the quoted rule is ex-
tractable therefrom, the reason being that in Knapp it was
not necessary to determine the exceptions based on slander
per se and the court did not do so, nor do we do so now
though we do not disagree with it.
58 368 P.2d 780 (Colo. 1962).
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It is within the context of these principles that these
alleged defamatory statements must be analyzed. The state-
ments appeared on a Rating-Change Report of defendant
concerning the financial condition of a Colorado corpora-
tion engaged in the retail jewelry business. Plaintiff con-
tends that a libel is apparent on the face of statements that
the Rating-Change Report was "prepared from unaudited
interim financial statement submitted directly by Harry
Bernstein, CPA." and that "... Bernstein does not respond
to request for interview."
We cannot say that it is defamatory on the face of a
commercial report to state that an accountant checked on
a retail jewelry corporation and took its business accounts
and entries at their face value. This, in effect, is all that the
statement "prepared from unaudited interim financial
statement" alleges. It must be remembered that to consti-
tute libel per se the libelous elements must be clearly ex-
pressed in the printed article. See Rocky Mt. News Printing
Co. v. Fridborn, 46 Colo. 440, 104 P. 956, 24 L.R.A., N.S., 891
(1909). And, in determining whether words are libelous
they are to be given their ordinary and popular meaning.
Knapp supra, 111 Colo. at 499, 144 P. 2d at 981; Prosser,
"Law of Torts", Second Edition (1955) at page 580. Nor is
it apparent how the mere statement that a Rating-Change
Report was prepared from an unaudited interim financial
statement affords any imputation of incompetence, dis-
honesty, or misconduct which is incompatible with the
proper conduct of plaintiff's profession or business. See
generally Prosser supra at pages 590-92. :"
B. Conversion
The limitations and prerequisites to recovery for conversion
caused the plaintiff's complaint to fail in the trial court and again
in the supreme court in McCartney v. Foster.60 The action against
the defendant sheriff, in the opinion of the court, was properly
dismissed by the trial court, because the deputy, who took the
disputed property into his possession, was not discharging an
official duty.6 1 Moreover, the court found that the plaintiff neces-
sarily had to fail as to the remaining defendant, who was the person
responsible for the taking of the property, because no proper de-
mand had been made for the return of the property, and no evi-
dence was offered to show that the property was improperly taken.
59 Id. at 783-84. See also Note, Torts-Libel Per Quad and Special Damages, 34 Rocky Mt. L. Rev.
580 (1962).
60 374 P.2d 704 (Colo. 1962).
61 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 35-5-5 (1953).
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